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Studi ini mengidentifikasi alasan di balik pemanfaatan atau pengabaian pemanfaatan 
atas berbagai mekanisme akuntabilitas dan menyelidiki bagaimana organisasi non-
pemerintah memanfaatkan dan menanggapi umpan balik dan hirauan yang diajukan. 
Studi kasus ini mengumpulkan data melalui penelitian pustaka dan penelitian lapangan 
yang dianalisis menggunakan analisis konten tematik. Temuan menunjukkan banyak 
hirauan yang muncul, baik sensitif atau non-sensitif, melalui nomor hotline, konsultasi 
masyarakat, kunjungan kantor, kotak umpan balik dan poster untuk melaporkan 
ketidakkonsistenan dalam pelaksanaan proyek dan menyatakan hal positif. Tekanan 
masyarakat, politisasi lokal, ketakutan akan pembalasan dari manajemen, dan lokasi 
yang jauh di mana mekanisme ini dipasang menghambat penerima manfaat untuk 
menyuarakan keprihatinan mereka. Secara umum, mekanisme akuntabilitas ini terbukti 
bermanfaat dan meningkatkan pelayanan-pengiriman dan implementasi proyek. 
 
Kata Kunci: akuntabilitas kemanusiaan, partisipasi penerima, pengambilan suara, 





This study identified the reasons behind the utilization or non-utilization of various 
accountability mechanisms and probed how these NGOs utilized and responded to the 
feedback and concerns raised. This case study gathered data through desk research and 
field works that were analyzed using thematic content analysis. Findings showed 
numerous concerns rose, either sensitive or non-sensitive, through hotline numbers, 
community consultation, office visitation, feedback box and posters to report 
inconsistencies in project implementation and express positive regard.  Community 
pressure, local politicking, fear of reprisal from management, and the distant location in 
which these mechanisms were posted hindered the beneficiaries from voicing out their 
concerns. Generally, these accountability mechanisms proved useful and improved 
service-delivery and project implementation.   
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The prominence of non-government organizations (NGOs), regardless whether local, 
national or international, has reached to the extent that they are seen as the ‘preferred 
channel’ for providing humanitarian and life-saving goods and services in ‘deliberate 
substitution’ for the state (Edwards & Hulme, 1995). In post-disaster context, NGOs’ 
humanitarian interventions filled the gap on service-delivery and post-disaster needs of 
disaster survivors. This was the case after the onslaught of super typhoon (ST) Haiyan 
in the Philippines in November 2013. Amidst numerous issues and controversies 
surrounding the early part of the rehabilitation phase, Filipinos expressed extreme 
disagreement in the government’s inability to handle aid and implement humanitarian 
projects in Haiyan-affected areas and saw NGOs to effectively the gap of the 
government’s failure. Deakins (2001) wrote that “in many areas where NGOs operate, 
state structures have progressively proved themselves to be inefficient and bureaucratic, 
fragile in the face of economic challenges, undermined by emerging ethnic conflicts or 
corrupted by unscrupulous politicians (‘kleptocrats’)”.   
However, the perceived reputation of NGOs has brought problems in holding 
them accountable to their beneficiaries. Their mysterious nature to the general public 
further complicates issues on accountability (Kearns, 1996). Given these issues and 
using ST Haiyan as the case under study, this research seeks to identify: a) The various 
downward accountability mechanisms utilized by NGOs during the rehabilitation phase 
of their Haiyan Response; b) The concerns raised by the beneficiaries through  the 
different accountability mechanisms; c) The reasons for the utilization and non-
utilization of the different  accountability mechanisms by the beneficiaries; and d) The 
ways selected NGOs utilized and responded to the concerns raised.   
This study is distinct because it focused on the relationship of the selected NGOs 
and their beneficiaries in terms of downward accountability by looking into the ways in 
which people utilized the accountability mechanisms, and the ways these NGOs 
responded to these, rather than only taking the presence of the feedback mechanisms as 
a manifestation of the practice of downward accountability. The theoretical application 
of this study will provide information regarding the application of the concept of ‘voice’ 
outside the context of state institutions, especially in studying unequal power relations 
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between NGOs and their beneficiaries. This study is one of the few locally conducted 
studies in the Philippines to view the dynamics of downward accountability of NGOs in 
the aftermath of ST Haiyan making it a pioneer in downward accountability studies in 
the country which may immensely benefit academic and policy-making bodies. Lastly, 
it contributes to the limited literature of the application of downward accountability 
practices in NGOs committed in humanitarian interventions and hopes to provide an 
example in which future researchers, and the academe in general, could base or anchor 




Disasters and Humanitarian Response in Haiyan 
 
Global warming brought about by climate change increases disasters and its effects may 
have significant impact (Cuaton, 2018) to communities especially in developing 
countries. Disasters are sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupt the functioning 
of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental 
losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources 
(IFRC, 2018). According to a policy paper released by The UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR, 2009), the number of disasters has doubled in the last 20 years. Latest data 
from the World Disasters Report released by the UN indicate that over the last ten 
years, more than one every day or a total of 3,571 natural hazards have been recorded, 
of which 84.2% had weather-related triggers affecting almost 134 million people (IFRC, 
2018). The events in question spanned over 90 countries and affected over 106 million 
people overall. In 2014, disasters accounted for USD99.00 billion in property and 
collateral damages, along with immeasurable negative effects on the development of 
local and global socioeconomic systems (Ager et al., 2015; Monllor & Murphy, 2017).  
On November 8, 2013, Super Typhoon (ST) Haiyan, locally known as Yolanda, 
made landfall in Central Philippines. The Category 5 typhoon was the strongest to hit 
land, causing unprecedented damage to nine regions, including 591 municipalities and 
56 cities spread across 44 provinces, and an estimated 16 million people were affected, 
many of whom lost their sources of livelihood, while approximately 4.4 million were 
displaced (USAID, 2014).  Haiyan destroyed much of Tacloban City–the capital of 
HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-HAIYAN RESPONSE  
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 Ginbert Permejo Cuanton 
176 | Departemen Hubungan Internasional FISIP UNPAD 
Leyte Province–and surrounding towns (Mangada, 2016) while nearly 8000 people 
were killed, and up to 90% of physical infrastructure was damaged (Maguire, 2014). 
The disaster brought numerous international and national non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to the Haiyan-stricken areas. In December 2014, a total of 107 
humanitarian organizations were operating in Eastern and Central Visayas that funded 
and/or implemented projects worth millions of dollars of aid money. Survivors were 
provided with their basic needs (i.e. food, water, medicines, vitamins, mats, blankets, 
cooking sets, solar lights, and temporary shelter materials) through the emergency 
response efforts and donations of 57 countries, 29 foreign military contingents, United 
Nations agencies, and international non-government organizations (NGOs) (CFE-
DMHA, 2014; Mangada, 2016). However, though there was no shortage of aid, relief 
efforts were not coordinated and humanitarian groups that rushed to affected areas 
independently chose their beneficiaries as the Philippine government failed to lay down 
guidelines for the provision of assistance. Duplication and overlapping of aid delivery 
was common and local government units were unaware of who was doing what, where, 
and when.  
The timely delivery and equal distribution of assistance was exacerbated by 
difficulties in traveling to inaccessible areas. Amidst these issues and concerns, many 
have observed that the NGOs’ humanitarian interventions filled the gap on service-
delivery and post-disaster needs of the survivors. NGOs were the preferred actors in 
giving humanitarian relief goods and services because Haiyan survivors expressed 
extreme disagreements and criticisms in the government’s inability to handle aid and 
implement projects in the early part of the rehabilitation phase.  Deakins (2001) 
explained that in many areas where NGOs operate, state structures have progressively 
proved themselves to be inefficient and bureaucratic, fragile in the face of economic 
challenges, undermined by emerging ethnic conflicts or corrupted by unscrupulous 
politicians (‘kleptocrats’). The prominence of NGOs, local, national or international, has 
reached to the extent that they are seen as the ‘preferred channel’ for providing service, 
in ‘deliberate substitution’ for the state (Edwards & Hulme, 1995). However, the 
perceived reputation of NGOs has brought problems in holding them accountable to 
their beneficiaries. Their mysterious nature to the general public further complicates 
issues on accountability (Kearns, 1996). 
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Humanitarian Accountability and Downward Accountability 
 
Different authors offer various definitions of accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). According 
to Paul (1991), accountability means “holding individuals and organizations 
responsible” by measuring its performance as “objectively as possible”.  For this 
research the author adopted the definition of Goetz & Jenkins (2007) who best thought 
accountability as a “relationship between two actors that is characterized by 
answerability (the requirement that one actor justify his actions) and enforcement (the 
right granted to the other actor to impose penalties if these actions, or the justification 
thereof, are deemed unsatisfactory)”. 
Existing literature of NGO accountability involved in humanitarian interventions 
focus primarily on their upward accountability, such as governments and private 
individual or group donors, and less on downward accountability or accountability to 
their beneficiaries. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are accountable to 
numerous actors (Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007; Jordan, 2007; Lloyd, 2005; Kearns, 
1996) but unlike government officials that are continuously exposed to public scrutiny 
and criticisms, workers in non-profit sectors like in non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) are relatively free of government oversight and public inspection (Kearns, 
1996).  Literature further demonstrates that it was only in the last few decades that the 
demand for greater and more transparent accountability from NGOs arose (Dhanani & 
Connolly, 2014; Burger & Seabe, 2014; Williams & Taylor, 2013; Lloyd, 2005; Kearns, 
1996) because of the a) rapid increase of NGOs worldwide that is deemed as negative 
because of the existence of NGOs with “unhealthy growth”, b) NGOs attract more 
funding than before which prompted calls for (NGO) accountability mechanisms, and c) 
NGOs have been perceived to be a rising power that have set many global policies, 
hence, “the more vocal NGOs become in the policy arena, the louder the call for [their] 
accountability” (Jordan, 2007). 
Najam (1996) introduced a model of NGO accountability whereby three 
categories were identified based on the organization’s interactions with other 
stakeholders in every model. These are: (1) NGO accountability to patrons; (2) NGO 
accountability to clients; and (3) NGO accountability to themselves. Najam defined 
‘patrons’ as the ones “who provide the NGO with goods or services” and ‘clients’ as the 
institutions or people “to whom the NGO provides goods or services”.  Because NGOs 
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are accountable to numerous actors (Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007; Jordan, 2007), the 
different forms of accountability often overlap and cannot be strictly separated from 
each other. In most cases, literatures show that NGOs prioritize accountability to its 
donors at the expense of accountability to beneficiaries and/or to its organizational 
mission (Ebrahim, 2007; Jordan, 2007; Leen, 2006; Lloyd, 2005). The underlying 
argument from various literature is in favor of Ebrahim’s (2007) claim that “the 
dominant emphasis currently remains largely on accountability of NGOs to donors or 
patrons” which then results to the weakness of NGOs in being accountable to their 
beneficiaries.   
Ebrahim (2007) argued that the NGOs’ focus on accountability to its donors 
“privileges one kind of accountability relation over a broader accountability system”. 
Accountability mechanisms of NGOs to their donors can “overshadow or marginalize 
mechanisms for holding NGOs accountable to communities or to their own missions”.  
In addition, the accountability mechanisms that emphasize rule-following operational 
behavior run the risk of promoting NGO activities that are so focused on short-term 
outputs and efficiency criteria that they lose sight of long-range goals concerning social 
development and change.  
Furthermore, the NGOs prioritization of accountability to its donors make the 
relationships between NGOs and their beneficiaries asymmetric (Ebrahim, 2007). This 
means that NGOs that provide services–education, healthcare, housing or shelter, and/or 
rural development–usually “provide a predetermined set of services to their ‘clients’”. 
In most cases, these set of services are accepted without conflict because, often, the 
interests of the beneficiaries are the same with those of the NGOs. However, if the 
offered services are deemed “inadequate” or “low priority”, beneficiaries’ options are 
generally limited to refusing the service (exit) and/or to complaining about them 
(voice). On the other hand, NGOs have the powerful option of threatening to “withdraw 
from current or future projects in the vent of noncooperation”. A critical aspect of 
accountability is enabling stakeholders to seek and receive response for grievances and 
alleged harm that entails deliberate effort to listen and respond to complaints raised by 
beneficiaries, and others living in the same area, about the quality of services delivered 
by aid agencies, and staff and volunteer behavior (including allegations of corruption, 
misconduct and sexual abuse and exploitation). Feedback, Complaint and Response 
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Mechanisms (CRMs), provide an opportunity for stakeholders to address complaints 
against an NGO’s decisions and actions (Blagescu & Lloyd, 2006).  
When NGO accountability is practiced, the trust of different stakeholders 
(donors, beneficiaries, other groups) increases because it proves the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the organization in delivering different services (Lee, 2004). Most 
importantly, listening to beneficiaries helps an organization to identify early on its 
programmatic problems, to detect fraud, to have better staff retention, and to save 
money among others (Blagescu & Lloyd, 2006; Bonino & Warner, 2014). Through a 
more active, accountable and meaningful engagement with the affected population, 
quality of aid delivery would be improved (Bonino & Warner, 2014).  
Given these dilemmas, the common challenge of NGOs in strengthening their 
accountability is to establish accountability mechanisms (Ebrahim, 2010) which serve  
as learning tools for the organization and for its primary stakeholders (Jordan, 2007). 
This study utilized Goetz and Jenkins’ (2007) concept of ‘voice’ and the Core 
Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHSQA) framework in studying 
accountability mechanisms of INGOs in Haiyan-affected communities and its 
beneficiaries. This study argues that although ‘voice capturing’ is the main function of 
establishing accountability mechanisms, this is difficult to accomplish due to the 
complexities of working on the ground. The concept of ‘voice capturing’ provides an 
avenue for involvement and participation of the NGOs’ beneficiaries in the project 
implementation but its application is challenging to implement. 
On the concept of ‘voice’, Anne Goetz and Rob Jenkins (2007) drifted from a 
static, passive definition of ‘voice’ to an operational and active definition. They stressed 
that “voice as a capacity to express views, opinions, experiences and priorities also has a 
ramification on ‘change’–demanding actions from those in power”. They added that 
“voice is not a metaphor for passive expression but a more proactive and demand-based 
legitimate claim for rights and entitlements”. Goetz and Jenkins (2007) see voice as 
“not only a mechanism for directly holding powerful actors to account, but also 
contributes to accountability indirectly, by allowing communities to arrive collectively 
at the standards against which the actions of power-holders are to be judged”.  
This paper also used Commitments Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9 of the Core 
Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHSQA) framework. The 
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CHSQA framework was developed and published by CHS Alliance, Group URD and 
the Sphere Project in 2014. The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and 
Accountability (CHS) is a direct result of the Joint Standards Initiative (JSI) in which 
the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) International, People in Aid and the 
Sphere Project joined forces to seek greater coherence for users of humanitarian 
standards. The JSI consulted more than 2,000 humanitarian workers in head offices, 
regions and in disaster-prone countries. The CHS replaced the 2010 HAP Standard in 
Accountability and Quality Management, the People in Aid Code of Good Practice in 
the Management and Support of Aid Personnel and the Core Standards section of the 
Sphere Handbook (CHS Alliance et al., 2014). The Nine Commitments and Quality 
Criteria are: 
1. Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate and 
relevant to their needs.  
Quality Criterion: Humanitarian response is appropriate and relevant. 
2. Communities and people affected by crisis have access to the humanitarian 
assistance they need at the right time.  
Quality Criterion: Humanitarian response is effective and timely. 
3. Communities and people affected by crisis can are not negatively affected and more 
prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action. 
Quality Criterion: Humanitarian response strengthens local capacities and avoids 
negative effects. 
4. Communities and people affected by crisis know their rights and entitlements, have 
access to information and participate in decisions that affect them. 
Quality Criterion: Humanitarian response is based on communication, participation 
and feedback. 
5. Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive 
mechanisms to handle complaints. 
Quality Criterion: Complaints are welcomed and addressed. 
6. Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary 
assistance.  
Quality Criterion: Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary. 
7. Communities and people affected by crisis can expect delivery of improved 
assistance as organizations learn from experience and reflection 
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Quality Criterion: Humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve. 
8. Communities and people affected by crisis receive the assistance they require from 
competent and well-managed staff and volunteers. 
Quality Criterion: Staffs are supported to do their job effectively, and are treated 
fairly and equitably. 
9. Communities and people affected by crisis can expect that the organizations 
assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically. 
Quality Criterion: Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended 
purpose. 
Commitment Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9 highlight that humanitarian assistance should 
be (a) appropriate and relevant, and (b) based on communication, participation and 
feedback; (c) complaints are welcomed and addressed; (d) humanitarian response is 
coordinated and complementary; and (e) resources are managed and used responsibly 




The field works were conducted in November 2014 and May 2015 in four barangays of 
Tacloban City, Palo and Dagami, Leyte. The selected barangays/villages were Barangay 
Aslum, Sagkahan in Tacloban City; Barangay Castilla in Palo, Leyte and Barangay 
Cansamada West and Tin-ao in Dagami, Leyte. These barangays were purposively 
selected because of the presence of rehabilitation projects of the selected NGOs which 
are the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Adventist Development and Relief 
Agency (ADRA). Both ADRA and CRS operated various housing and livelihood 
programs in the identified barangays/villages. 
Barangay Aslum is a coastal barangay in the Sagkahan District of Tacloban 
City. It was one of the hardest hit barangays during super typhoon Haiyan, and the 
chosen pilot community among 17 barangays for the different humanitarian 
interventions of the Catholic Relief Services in Tacloban City. Palo is strategically 
located in the northern part of the Province of Leyte and is composed of 33 barangays/ 
villages. The main source of income for most citizens in Palo is buying and selling farm 
products, and the local wine "tuba" manufacturing and fermentation. Barangay Castilla 
is one of the most remote barangays in the municipality.   
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Barangay Cansamada West and Barangay Tin-ao are in Dagami, Leyte. Dagami, 
Leyte is composed of 65 barangays wherein 56 of these are rural barangays and 9 are 
urban counterparts. Rice farming is the largest contributor to its annual agricultural 
produce with 13,016 metric tons from only 3,713 hectares of planting area. Barangay 
Cansamada West and Tin-ao were vastly affected by super typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and 
the floods brought by tropical storm Seniang in 2014. Using a qualitative research 
design, data were gathered through a combination of desk research and field works. The 
author used case study method because this research is interested in understanding and 
explaining the relationship of international NGOs with their beneficiaries through the 
various downward accountability mechanisms.  
A case study may be understood as an intensive study of a single or few cases 
where the purpose is, or at least in part, to shed light on a larger class of cases (Gerring, 
2007). Gerring (2007) defined cases as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) 
observed at a single point in time or over some period of time. It comprises the type of 
phenomenon that an inference attempts to explain”. The strengths of case study research 
lies on its ability to “generate high conceptual validity; strong procedures for fostering 
new hypotheses; their value as useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of 
causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing 
causal complexity” (George & Bennett, 2005).  
Semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group 
discussions (FGDs) were utilized in collecting data and consent form is given and 
signed by respondents signifying their unforced participation in the study. Respondents 
were also informed that should they feel uncomfortable with the discussions; they may 
opt to end the discussion any time. All interviews and FGDs were conducted in Waray-
waray, local language in Eastern Visayas region. According to Vanderstoep and 
Johnston (2009), “…techniques such as interviews and focus groups allow research 
participants to give very detailed and specific answers”.  The first set of data was 
obtained from in-depth, key informant interviews with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) selected personnel. These 
included the selected INGOs concept or definition of accountability and how it was 
practiced in its different humanitarian interventions; the various downward 
accountability mechanisms utilized by these INGOs; the reasons behind its utilization or 
non-utilization; and the ways in which these mechanisms are informed to the people and 
Intermestic: Journal of International Studies 
Volume 3, No. 2, Mei 2019 (173-194) doi:10.24198/intermestic.v3n2.5 
 
www.intermesticjournal.fisip.unpad.ac.id. | 183  
e-ISSN.2503-443X 
how the organizations reacted on the feedback and complaints obtained through these 
mechanisms. The second set of data was obtained from the focus group discussions 
(FGDs) and in-depth interviews with selected beneficiaries and community leaders from 
the aforementioned barangays. These data are crucial in understanding whether the data 
obtained from the INGOs’ personnel are parallel or not. The information was used to 
verify and to see the similarities and conflicts from the data obtained from the different 
respondents of this study. 
The author utilized the principle of qualitative deductive content analysis which 
involved three major phases, namely: preparation, organization and reporting of the 
results (Elo et al., 2014).  The preparation phase consisted of collecting suitable data for 
content analysis, making sense of the data, and selecting the unit of analysis (ibid.). In 
deductive content analysis, the organization phase involves categorization matrix 
development, whereby all the data are reviewed for content and coded for 
correspondence to or exemplification of the identified categories (Polit & Beck, 2012). 
In the reporting phase, results are described by the content of the categories describing 
the phenomenon using a selected approach (ibid.) Content analysis is applied in 
qualitative, quantitative, and sometimes mixed modes of research frameworks and 
employs a wide range of analytical techniques to generate findings and put them into 
context. It is a systematic, rigorous approach to analyzing documents obtained or 
generated in the course of research (White & Marsh, 2006; Downe‐Wamboldt, 2009; 
Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Theme 1: Types of Downward Accountability Mechanisms 
 
The results identified nine (9) downward accountability mechanisms of both CRS and 
ADRA that were either institutionalized or assembled in their humanitarian 
interventions in Haiyan-affected areas.  However, between these NGOs, CRS utilized 
more mechanisms than ADRA. This can be attributed to absence of internal policy 
mandating ADRA to create and establish accountability mechanisms in its Haiyan 
Response. In fact, ADRA personnel emphasized that they have just made efforts in 
establishing such mechanisms because other NGOs have it in their Haiyan Responses.  
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Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) Department  
 
CRS has a Protection and Accountability Department even before its Haiyan Response.  
During the emergency phase, the Accountability Department was independent from 
other departments. However, this scheme has ‘evolved’ during the recovery phase 
because it was merged with the Monitoring and Evaluation department and now called 
the Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) department. The 
department is responsible for ensuring that downward accountability is practiced by 
CRS personnel. The Department personnel visit the target barangays and initiate the 
conduct of community assemblies/meetings. Their main task is to inform their prospect 
beneficiaries about the different activities and projects that CRS will implement. 
On the other hand, the lack of policy that mandates ADRA to practice 
downward accountability mechanisms has put the responsibility of promoting and 
enabling such mechanisms to the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. At the time of 
writing, it was found that there was no internal mandate that obligates the organization 
to create an Accountability Department.   
Monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL) are part of 
everyday program management and are critical to the success of all projects, including 
those operating in fragile contexts. Without an effective MEAL system organizations 
would be unable to track progress, make adjustments, discover unplanned effects of 
programs, or judge the impact made on the lives of those with whom the organization 
are working. A MEAL system also helps to be accountable to stakeholders through 
information sharing and developing a complaints or feedback mechanism which can 
help to guide program implementation. 
 
Feedback Boxes   
 
CRS and ADRA have an assembled feedback box mechanism to give their beneficiaries 
an opportunity to make suggestions, give feedback or make a complaint related to the 
organizations’ commitments, programs or staffs’ conducts (Jean & Bonino, 2013). More 
than the traditional locked wooden box, these systems are responsive techniques for 
encouraging feedback and rewarding great suggestions. Field workers bring it during 
community meetings so that beneficiaries could write their feedback and complaints. 
Beneficiaries have the choice to not indicate their names in the feedbacks/complaints. 
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Although some feedback boxes are available in the communities, these are not easily 
accessible to beneficiaries especially to those who are living in far flung villages. The 
intentions of these mechanisms which are to capture ‘voice’ and to involve the 
beneficiaries in the decision-making and other processes of the NGOs’ project 
implementation are, therefore, not fully realized. 
 
Community Meetings  
 
Community Meeting as a downward accountability mechanism is used by both NGOs 
to solicit opinions and questions regarding their humanitarian interventions from their 
beneficiaries. NGOs entering a new area have a responsibility to understand local 
agreements and to work within these agreements to the best of their ability. The staffs of 
both organizations use Waray-Waray (official language in  Leyte and Samar, Eastern 
Visayas) and/or Tagalog languages in communicating during community meetings. 
This is helpful because familiarizing international humanitarian practitioners with local 
culture and contextualizing programs is essential to minimize risk of harm, maximize 
benefit, and optimize efficient use of resources (Greene et al., 2017). It is important to 
understand local practices and community organizations before establishing operations. 
NGOs should respect and where possible work with established local structures, 
suggesting minor adaptations (e.g. to promote gender equality) rather than creating new 
(rival) groups (Brooks, 2010).  
On both organizations, staffs encouraged their beneficiaries to voice out their 
concerns and feedback during community meetings. Specifically, their beneficiaries 
were encouraged to ask questions regarding their projects. It has been observed that 
conducting community meetings was effective in terms of engaging the beneficiaries 
and the INGOs in a dialogue, where those with power can be held accountable by the 
beneficiaries (Paul, 1991). The community meetings can be an avenue where the 
‘questioning voice’ can be exercised, where demands can be expressed.  Most of the 
questions pertaining to the technicalities of the project implementation in shelter and 
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Community Ambassador  
 
Only CRS has this particular mechanism. The beneficiaries were tasked to choose one 
of the residents of the barangay to act as a community ambassador. The candidate or 
appointed community ambassador should come from the community and should be 
elected and voted by the same people of the community. The ambassador is tasked to be 
a channel of feedback and complaints from the beneficiaries which he/she then reports 
to the CRS personnel. This mechanism was established in order for local politicking to 
be, if not eradicated, minimized through the non-involvement of the barangay council in 
the selection and implementation process of the organization’s projects.  
 
Informal Discussions with Humanitarian Personnel  
 
Both organizations have encouraged and exercised the practice of informal discussions 
with their personnel and their beneficiaries. This is another way for the beneficiaries to 
give their feedback and/or complaints to the services and personnel of both INGOs. 
When doing project monitoring, beneficiaries could easily talk with NGO personnel on 
various matters especially on clarifications regarding program implementation 
 
Slogans and Tarpaulins  
 
Through their own initiative, beneficiaries printed or wrote their ‘Thanks’ on a manila 
paper, tarpaulin, wood or plain bond paper, and stamp it outside their houses so that 
NGO personnel or donors can see it easily. Some households encoded their thanks on 
bond papers while some with extra money just decided to make one person collect the 
money while another person was in-charge of the design or layout of the tarpaulin. This 
effort reinforced the beneficiaries’ initiative, because most people’s contribution was 
just monetary and only a few people did the work. The beneficiaries’ time and efforts 
were minimized and instead utilized in other household chores. Interestingly, this 
mechanism was only used by beneficiaries to express their gratitude to the organization. 
Furthermore, no complaint written through the slogans, tarpaulins or placards have been 
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Community Help Desk 
 
Only the CRS employed this kind of accountability mechanism. CRS has help desks in 
their office where the beneficiaries or anyone who has any complaint in the organization 
is welcomed and accommodated. The Community Help Desk (CHD)/Office is another 
mechanism for receiving and responding to issues, comments, suggestions and feedback 
from the community members or beneficiaries which gives them an opportunity to 
provide feedback and suggestions in a non-threatening way (Jean & Bonino, 2013). It is 
commonly used by humanitarian organizations in their projects because the 
beneficiaries feel safe and valued with the presence of NGO workers and the notion that 
they are there to help them.   
 
Hotlines/ Community Call Centers  
 
Both organizations have hotline numbers in their humanitarian interventions in the 
Haiyan response. The hotline numbers of CRS were written on the feedback boxes and 
on the whiteboard posted outside the community ambassador’s house in barangay 
Aslum. The hotline numbers were also made known to the beneficiaries during 
community meetings. Meanwhile, ADRA also has an assembled hotline number which 
was also initiated by the monitoring and evaluation officer. He requested for a hotline 
number from the project manager and used this mechanism during their humanitarian 
operations. Two numbers in two mobile networks operating in Leyte were used for this 
mechanism, namely Globe and Smart. 
Proper information dissemination coupled with complaints procedures such as 
“Hotlines” or “Community Call Centers (CCC)”, beneficiaries are given the knowledge 
and avenue to quickly voice their concerns and feedback on unsatisfactory aid services 
or even the organization’s staff performance (Paul, 1991; Jean & Bonino, 2014). 
 
Channels through Barangay Officials  
 
Findings show that some beneficiaries channeled their feedback and complaints through 
the barangay officials. A two-term councilor of barangay Aslum, shared that some of 
his constituents went to him and gave suggestions on certain projects and/or asked for 
clarifications. These suggestions or clarifications were then relayed to CRS and ADRA 
HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-HAIYAN RESPONSE  
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 Ginbert Permejo Cuanton 
188 | Departemen Hubungan Internasional FISIP UNPAD 
via the hotline numbers. Community officials, as a publicly elected officer, regard this 
act as their contribution in giving social services. 
 
Theme 2: Reasons for the Utilization and Non-utilization of the Accountability 
Mechanisms 
 
There were varying factors that contributed to the utilization and non-utilization of 
different downward accountability mechanisms established and/or assembled by CRS 
and ADRA. The utilization of the downward accountability mechanisms by the 
beneficiaries depended on factors such as (1) sensitivity of a feedback or complaint, (2) 
level of satisfaction of beneficiaries on the project implementation, (3) intellectual and 
economic capacity of the beneficiary to utilize the mechanism, (4) fear of reprisal from 
the management of the INGOs and (5) attitude of the beneficiaries towards the INGOs 
and the projects they conduct. The beneficiaries for both INGOs mainly utilized the 
mechanisms in order to express their gratitude and ask clarifications and updates. 
Most of the letters and text messages that CRS received from their feedback 
boxes and hotline numbers were messages of gratitude and appreciation and these are 
considered as non-sensitive. This can be attributed to the nature of thanksgiving and 
gratitude which is accepted by the INGO with the least degree of sensitivity involved in 
channeling such feedback to the organization. The various mechanisms were also used 
in clarifying the selection process of the projects. There was discontentment amongst 
the non-beneficiaries in barangay Cansamada and Tin-ao in Dagami, Leyte since they 
expressed their intention of being included in the list of beneficiaries in the shelter 
assistance of CRS. They opted to choose the aid given by CRS rather than the aid given 
to them by the National Housing Authority (NHA) because of the superior quality and 
larger quantities of materials distributed. 
On the other hand, aside from forgetting the hotline numbers, fear of reprisal 
from the organizations’ managements hindered the beneficiaries in voicing their 
concerns. This fear stemmed from the communities’ experience in one NGO that 
warned that they might pull out or cancel their projects if non-cooperation occurred. 
This situation fueled the beneficiaries’ fear because other community members who 
were in dire need of the support would surely suffer. This is reflective of the 
“asymmetric relationship” (Ebrahim, 2007) of beneficiaries and NGOs. Beneficiaries 
are at the mercy of the INGOs since these entities have the option to stop or pull out 
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theirs resources that support the projects they implement in their target barangays, while 
the beneficiaries have no option as to where to avail of such services these INGOs offer. 
This is the reason why beneficiaries of such projects are cautious of doing actions that 
may disappoint the INGO.  
Such a case is not only confined to among the beneficiaries of the NGOs, but 
also apparent to some personnel of the organizations. In ADRA, some of its personnel 
did not report the complaints to their superiors for fear that it will decrease the 
superior’s regard on the personnel’s performance in the organization and eventually 
lead to expulsion. In cases where there were foreign nationals who spoke during 
community meetings or barangay visits, some beneficiaries were simply shy and found 
it hard to speak because of their fear of getting embarrassed by other community 
members. This can be considered as one of the intellectual and language barriers in the 
transmission of communication. In such cases, some beneficiaries asked other 
beneficiaries who know and can better speak the English language to ask on their 
behalf. The financial capacity of some beneficiaries and even non-beneficiaries 
hindered them from using the different accountability mechanisms. In rural and poor 
communities, instead of buying cellphone load, people use it to buy food and other 
needs of the family instead. As what an informant said, “My complaint can wait but my 
hungry stomach can’t.”  
Lastly, it was observed that there’s a prevailing mindset amongst the 
beneficiaries that the aid given to them are considered as ‘gifts’. Because the projects 
were given to them freely, the beneficiaries feel a lesser need to complain, to ask for 
improvement of services provided and/or demand for more projects because it might 
send misconceptions that these beneficiaries are being ungrateful and discontented from 
the aid provided.  
 
Theme 3: Responses and Utilization of Feedback and Complaint by CRS and ADRA  
 
The responses revolved on the INGOs’ timely response, proper handling of complaints, 
categorization of complaints and feedback as well as face-to-face response of the 
feedback.  The staffs who receive the complaints categorized them as either sensitive or 
non-sensitive. Complaints are categorized as sensitive while feedback, like messages of 
thanks and gratitude are regarded as non-sensitive. Sensitive complaints like local 
HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-HAIYAN RESPONSE  
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 Ginbert Permejo Cuanton 
190 | Departemen Hubungan Internasional FISIP UNPAD 
politicking, alleged favoritism in the selection process and discontent of services are 
branded as sensitive and require actions from the staff. 
When a feedback is given, they do not reply on it. However on sensitive 
complaints, the organization usually requires the staff to answer the complaint within 
two to five working days. If the staffs during fieldwork know the answer to the 
questions or complaints of the beneficiaries, they are to respond immediately. If the 
concern or complaint is beyond the staff’s knowledge, capacity, training or job 
description, they usually advise the complainant/s to wait for the answer because they 
will ask their supervisors first.  
As much as possible, complaints were addressed within 24 hours upon receipt. 
Complaints raised were verified by personally visiting and inspecting the person or the 
complaint i.e. infrastructure raised. This, however, depends whether the beneficiary 
indicated his/her name when he/she complained. They did not force the beneficiaries to 





The findings demonstrate that Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) have assembled downward accountability 
mechanisms in their rehabilitation interventions in Haiyan-affected areas. However, 
between the INGOs, only the Catholic Relief Services has an institutionalized 
downward accountability mechanisms and utilized more downward accountability 
mechanisms.  
The mechanisms utilized reflected varied feedback and complaints. The 
feedback from the beneficiaries included the organizations’ holistic service-delivery, the 
staff’s approachability and friendliness and the gratitude of the beneficiaries for the 
interventions provided by the INGO. The mechanisms reflected allegations of local 
politicking on the project processes and unjust criteria of beneficiary selection. The 
informants cited that the NGOs’ response from their feedback and complaints were 
timely, were handled properly and were answered on a face-to-face basis.  
The utilization of the downward accountability mechanisms by the beneficiaries 
depended on factors such as (1) the degree of sensitivity of a feedback or complaint, (2) 
level of satisfaction of beneficiaries on the different project processes, (3) intellectual 
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and economic capacity of the beneficiary to utilize the mechanisms, (4) fear of possible 
reprisal from the management of the INGOs and (5) attitude of the beneficiaries towards 
the INGOs and the projects it conducts.   
The mechanisms utilized by both NGOs are capable of addressing the concerns 
of the beneficiaries. However, the author argues that the presence of such mechanisms 
is not sufficient in judging the extent to which NGOs practice downward accountability 
mechanisms. Rather, the extent to which these mechanisms permit the conduct of 
participation of beneficiaries in project is identified by ALNAP (2019) as the gauge in 
the effectiveness of such mechanisms. ALNAP stresses that an effective mechanism 
supports the collection, acknowledgement, analysis and response to the feedback 
received. The mechanisms do support the collection and acknowledgement of the 
feedback it receives but the action and response to the feedback and complaints still rest 
on the prerogative of the NGO to act upon such. 
The responses of the various informants manifested the different treatments of 
feedback and complaints of the selected NGOs in the conduct of their humanitarian 
response. These can be attributed to the proper functioning of the downward 
accountability mechanisms and the commitment of NGOs to the feedback they received. 
Given these, the downward accountability mechanisms can be considered effective at 
the minimum standard indicated by ALNAP (2019) since the mechanisms permit the 
collection, analysis and response of the feedback and complaints in a manner that has 
satisfied its beneficiaries. 
In conclusion, the manner of questioning the organization by the respondents of 
both organizations is the manifestation of the ‘questioning voice’, in which in this 
manner, the non-beneficiaries held the organization to account for the reasons why they 
were not included in the shelter intervention. However, the NGOs are still in a position 
where they have the power to not entertain questions and demands by stating different 




Ager, A., Smith, M. B., Barbelet, V., Carpenter, S., & Wooster, K. (2015). World 
Disasters Report: Focus on local actors, the key to humanitarian effectiveness. in 
Hamza, M. (Ed.) World Disasters Report, Lyon, France: Chirat. 
ALNAP. (2019). The State of Humanitarian System 2018. Retrieved November 21, 
2019 from https://sohs.alnap.org/ 
HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-HAIYAN RESPONSE  
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 Ginbert Permejo Cuanton 
192 | Departemen Hubungan Internasional FISIP UNPAD 
Blagescu, M. & Lloyd, R. (2006). 2006 Global Accountability Report: Holding Power 
to Account. Retrieved November 21, 2019 from 
http://www.worldvision.or.kr/business/pdfdown/2006_GAR.pdf    
Bonino F. & Warner, A. (2014). What Makes Humanitarian Feedback Mechanisms 
Work? Literature Review to Support an ALNAP–CDA Action Research into 
Humanitarian Feedback Mechanisms. ALNAP Working Paper. London: 
ALNAP/ODI 
Brooks, N. (2010). Guidelines for Working with Community Volunteers and Committees 
in Humanitarian Agencies. Retrieved on October 21, 2018 from 
https://odihpn.org/magazine/guidelines-for-working-with-community-volunteers-
and-committees-in-humanitarian-emergencies/ 
Burger, R. & Seabe, D. (2014). NGO Accountability in Africa: The Handbook of Civil 
Society in Africa. New York: Springer. 
CFE-DMHA (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance. (2014). Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and 




Cuaton, G. (2018). A Post-Disaster Assessment of Women-Led Handicraft Industry in 
The Philippines. Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the 
Global Economy. Bingley, United Kingdom: Emerald Publishing. 
Deakins, N. (2001). In Search of Civil Society. Hampshire, New York: Palgrave 
Publisher Limited. 
Dhanani, A., & Connolly, C. (2014). Non-governmental Organizational Accountability: 
Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk? Journal of Business Ethics, 129 (3): 613-
637. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2172-1 
Downe‐Wamboldt, B. (2009). Content Analysis: Methods, Applications and Issues. 
Health Care for Women International, 13 (3): 313-321. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07399339209516006    
Ebrahim, A. (2003). Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms of NGOs. Great Britain: 
World Development.  
Ebrahim, A. (2005). Accountability Myopia: Losing Sight of Organizational Learning. 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 34 (1): 56-87. doi: 
10.1177/0899764004269430 
Ebrahim, A. (2007). Towards a Reflexive Accountability in NGOs. Case Study. doi: 
10.1017/CBO9780511490903.013   
Ebrahim, A. (2010). The Many Faces of Nonprofit Accountability. Harvard Business 
School.   
Ebrahim, A., & Weisband, E. (2007). Global Accountabilities: Participation, Pluralism, 
and Public Ethics. Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.   
Edwards, M., & Hulme, D. (1995). Non-Governmental Performance and Accountability 
Beyond the Magic Bullet. London, United Kingdom: Earthscan Publications 
Limited.   
Elo, S., Kääriäinen, M., Kanste, O., Pölkki, T., Utriainen, K. & Kyngäs, H. (2014). 
Qualitative Content Analysis: Focus on Trustworthiness. SAGE Open, 4 (1): 1-10. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244014522633 
George, A. & Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
Intermestic: Journal of International Studies 
Volume 3, No. 2, Mei 2019 (173-194) doi:10.24198/intermestic.v3n2.5 
 
www.intermesticjournal.fisip.unpad.ac.id. | 193  
e-ISSN.2503-443X 
Gerring, J. (2007). Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.  
Goetz, A. & Jenkins, R. (2005). Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work 
for Human Development. New York, USA: Palgrave McMillan.  
Greene, M., Jordans, M., Kohrt, B. & Tol, W. (2017). Addressing Culture and Context 
in Humanitarian Response: Preparing Desk Reviews to Inform Mental Health and 
Psychosocial Support. Conflict and Health Journal, 11 (21). doi: 10.1186/s13031-
017-0123-z 
Hsieh, H. & Shannon, S. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. 
SAGE Journals, 15 (9). doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687 
IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). (2018). 
World Disasters Report 2018 Leaving No One Behind. Retrieved 11 November, 
2018 from: www.ifrc.org  
Jean, I. & Bonino, F. (2013). ‘We are Committed to Listen to You’: World Vision’s 
Experience with Humanitarian Feedback Mechanisms in Darfur. ALNAP CDA 
Case Study. London: ALNAP/ODI.  Retrieved 11 November, 2018 from: 
www.alnap.org/resource/8851 
Jordan, L. (2007). A Rights-Based Approach to Accountability. Ebrahim, A. & 
Weisband, E. (Eds.) Global Accountabilities: Participation, Pluralism, and Public 
Ethics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Kearns, K.P. (1996). Managing for Accountability: Preserving the Public Trust in 
Public and Nonprofit Organizations. San Francisco, California. Jossey-Bass 
Publisher.  
Lee, J. (2004). NGO Accountability: Rights and responsibilities. Geneva, Switzerland: 
Program on NGOs and Civil Society CASIN.  
Leen, M. (2006). NGO Accountability: Issues, Lessons and Challenges for Dóchas and 
its Members. Dublin: Dóchas. 
Lloyd, R. (2005). The Role of NGO Self-Regulation in Increasing Stakeholder 
Accountability. London, United Kingdom: One World Trust.     
Maguire, J. (2014). Pacific Cities Sustainability Initiatives: Creating Resilient and 
Livable Cities. Asia Society. Retrieved  11 November, 2018 from: 
https://asiasociety.org/files/PCSI_Creating_Resilient_and_Livable_Cities 
Mangada, L. (2016). Post-Haiyan adaptation and Institutional Barriers to Women 
Survivors in Tacloban. Philippines Political Science Journal, 37 (2): 94-110. doi: 
10.1080/01154451.2016.1196855 
Monllor, J., and Murphy, P. (2017). Natural Disasters, Entrepreneurship, and Creation 
After Destruction. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 
23 (4): 618-637. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJEBR-02-2016-0050 
Najam, A. (1996). NGO Accountability: A Conceptual Framework. Development Policy 
Review, 14 (4): 339-354. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.1996.tb00112.x 
Paul, S. (1991). Accountability in Public Service: Exit, Voice, and Capture. Country 
Economics Department: the World Bank.   
Polit, D.F. & Beck, C.T. (2012) Nursing Research: Generating and Assessing Evidence 
for Nursing Practice. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins. 
UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency). (2009). Climate change, natural disasters and 
human displacement: a UNHCR Perspective. Retrieved 11 November, 2018 from 
https://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.pdf 
HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-HAIYAN RESPONSE  
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 Ginbert Permejo Cuanton 
194 | Departemen Hubungan Internasional FISIP UNPAD 
Vanderstoep, S.W. & Johnston, D.D. (2009) Research Methods for Everyday Life 
Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
White, M. D. & Marsh, E. E. (2006). Content Analysis: A flexible methodology. 
Library Trends, 55 (1): 22-45.  
Williams, A. & Taylor, J. (2013). Resolving Accountability Ambiguity in Nonprofit 
Organizations. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 
24 (3): 559-580 
 
 
 
  
